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To Complicity…and Beyond!  Passive Assistance and Positive 
Obligations in International Law 
Alexander A. D. Brown* 
 
Abstract 
Despite an apparent determination by the International Court of Justice that complicity 
under Article 16 ASR can only result from positive acts, it will be argued that a State may be 
responsible for complicity through passive assistance. Though complicity by omission has 
received academic acknowledgement, the concept is unduly restricted; posited as contingent on 
a pre-existing positive obligation to act, and thus necessarily entailing a violation of this primary 
norm. If this is so, complicity creates a duality of responsibility and is arguably rendered 
redundant, as it will always be easier to show that a State violated this positive obligation, than 
successfully leap the many hurdles of Article 16 ASR. This understanding of passive complicity 
will be challenged on a number of grounds, ultimately leading to the assertion that international 
law does recognise a useful concept of passive assistance, distinct and untethered from positive 
obligations.  This is termed ‘complicity by inaction’ – passive assistance that is not per se 
wrongful. 
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1   Introduction 
The treatment of terrorist suspects in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 has raised 
challenging questions concerning the responsibility of States for participation in the 
internationally wrongful acts of others. 1   Recent reports have substantiated claims of ill-
treatment, and revealed an extensive clandestine cooperation network involving over a quarter of 
all UN States. In summarising these findings, a UN Special Rapporteur described the active and 
passive assistance given to the CIA rendition, detention, and torture programme: “CIA black 
sites had been located on the territory of Lithuania, Morocco, Poland, Romania and Thailand, 
and the officials of at least 49 other States within and outside the Council of Europe had allowed 
their airspace or airports to be used for rendition flights”. 2  Whilst the granting of these 
‘overflight rights’ is capable of constituting complicity,3 what is the position if a State is passive, 
and instead of positively granting rights, merely acquiesces, and with knowledge of the user’s 
illegal purpose does not object to the use of their airspace?4  Is a pre-existing positive obligation, 
owed by the prospective ‘assister’ to prevent the wrongful objective, significant for the purposes 
of establishing complicity? In other words, if complicity by omission is possible, is it contingent 
on the breach of a positive obligation? And would such a position exclude the prospect of 
recognising complicity by inaction, where the act of assistance is otherwise lawful? As complex 
and covert cooperation systems expand and multiply, a rigidly bilateral approach to 
                                                      
1 H. P. Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility, (Cambridge, CUP, 2011), at pp. 1, 115–227. M. 
Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, (Oxford, OUP, 2011), at pp. 124–126. V. 
Lanovoy, ‘Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act’, in Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos (eds.), Principles of 
Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art, (Cambridge, CUP, 2014) p.155.  
2 Al Nashiri v. Poland, 24 July 2014, ECHR, no. 28761/11, at para. 481. 
3 Aust, supra note 1, at pp. 115 – 128; Lanovoy, supra note 1, at p. 147. Though the issue is not ‘black and white’: 
Edward Horgan v. An Taoiseach and others, 2003, Irish High Court, Application for Declaratory Relief, no. 3739P, 
para. 174.  
4 The issue of passive complicity was raised briefly, but not dealt with comprehensively in Al Nashir v. Poland: see 
the submission by the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International as a third party intervener, 
supra note 2, para. 448.  See also: Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, 24 July 2014, ECHR, no. 7511/13, paras. 421 
– 424, 443 - 444; El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 13 December 2012, ECHR, no. 
39630/09, para. 239. 
responsibility looks increasingly inapt, and the answers to these questions gain heightened 
importance for the continued legitimacy of the international legal order. 5 
Complicity, as codified in Article 16 of the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 6 imposes responsibility on States that aid and assist breaches of 
international law. A traditional understanding of complicity (i.e. by commission) imposes limited 
responsibility, but is somewhat underdeveloped. As is evidenced by the impunity with which 
States assisted in CIA rendition, complicity only partly addresses a disparity in legal and moral 
responsibility, and is unable to adequately assuage concerns over accountability.7 The concept of 
complicity through omission has the potential to yield a more comprehensive and equitable 
imposition of State responsibility, emphasising and expressing a more robust denunciation of 
contributions to wrongful acts.  
Despite the absence of acknowledgement in Article 16 ASR, and claims by the International 
Court of Justice that complicity can only be committed by positive acts,8 it will be argued that 
States can incur responsibility for complicity by omission.9 In order to do so, some authors 
suggest, a pre-existing obligation to act must be incumbent on that State,10 and thus any passivity 
necessarily entails a violation of this primary norm. In such situations, complicity has been said 
to be rendered redundant as it will always be easier to show that a State violated its due diligence 
                                                      
5 A. Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’, in Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos (eds.) Principles of Shared Responsibility in 
International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art, (Cambridge, CUP, 2014), p. 4; Lanovoy, supra note 1, p. 
134. 
6  Annexed to General Assembly Resolution 56/83.  Hereinafter ‘ASR’. 
7 V. Lowe, International Law, (Oxford, OUP, 2007), p. 121. 
8  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, at p. 43, para. 432. Hereinafter ‘Bosnia v. 
Serbia’. Similar conclusions have been reached at the ICTR: Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 1998, ICTR–96–4T, para. 548. 
See also: J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part, (Cambridge, CUP, 2013), p. 403. 
9 Nolte and Aust, ‘Equivocal Helpers: Complicit States, Mixed Messages and International Law’, 58 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (2009), p. 10; M. Milanovic, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow up’, 18 
The European Journal of International Law (2007), p. 687; A. Gattini, ‘Beach of Obligations to Prevent and 
Reparation Thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment’, 18 The European Journal of International Law (2007) p. 703; 
K. Nahapetian, ‘Confronting State Complicity in International Law’, 7 UCLA Journal of International Law and 
Foreign Affairs, (2002) p. 122. 
10 Aust, supra note 1, p. 227; Lanovoy, supra note 1, p. 147.  
obligations, than successfully leap the many hurdles of Article 16. 11  This position will be 
challenged on a number of grounds.  
First, by examining the concept of complicity by omission, this article seeks to ascertain the 
contours of Article 16 ASR, assessing whether omissions are necessarily excluded from its 
purview. Recent scholarship, whilst mooting the possibility of complicity by omission, has failed 
to address the issue comprehensively, veering into a discussion of positive obligations. But this 
misses the salient issue: the causation based nature of the material element highlights the 
problematic tension between omissions and causation with which other legal regimes have 
grappled. The material element of Article 16 does not exclude omissions, per se; it merely 
requires a causative link which is difficult, but not impossible, to establish by omission.  
Secondly, the claims that complicity by omission is possible only where the complicit action 
also violates a pre-existing positive obligation will be examined. The existence of a positive 
obligation may increase the moral culpability of the inaction, but given that complicity through 
omission may fail to meet the material, not subjective element, how can positive obligations 
provide the necessary cure for this causative deficiency? Additionally, there are many conceptual 
differences between positive obligations and complicity by omission, but if the former are 
necessary to facilitate responsibility for the latter, are the two concepts in danger of merging?  
Thirdly, this article will seek to take the rationale of complicity one step further, and 
speculate on the possibility of complicity by a different form of passivity: by omission in the 
absence of a positive obligation, or ‘inaction’. ‘Omission’ assumes a prior duty to act, and that 
the State, by not acting, has failed in this obligation; “a doing contrary to a norm is a 
commission, a non-doing is an omission”.12 ‘Inaction’, conversely, is a neutral term, which does 
not presuppose a legal obligation to act. ‘Complicity by inaction’ could engage responsibility 
where the would-be complicit State’s inaction is lawful per se, but engages responsibility where 
this inaction contributes to an internationally wrongful act. Though seemingly controversial, this 
should be the aim of a functional derivative responsibility regime.  
                                                      
11 Corten and Klein, ‘The Limits of Complicity as a Ground for Responsibility’, in Bannelier el al (eds.), The ICJ 
and the Evolution of International Law: The Enduring Impact of the Corfu Channel Case, (London, Routledge, 
2012), p. 331. 
12 T. Honore, ‘Are Omissions Less Culpable?’ in Cane and Stapleton, Essays for Patrick Atiyah (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1991) p. 33. 
Throughout the examination of the concept of complicity by omission, reference will be 
made to the fictional scenario, provided below: 
State X plans to carry out an attack against State Z in violation of Article 2(4) UN Charter.13 
State Y is a State geographically located between X and Z. Consider these three alternative 
scenarios: 
a)   In order to carry out this attack, X’s planes must refuel in Y. Y, knowing of X’s purposes, 
grants permission for X’s planes to refuel en route to attacking Z. X attacks Z. 
b)   In order to carry out the attack, X must fly through the airspace of Y. Y has ratified a treaty 
establishing a common security and defence policy with Z providing, inter alia, that Y will 
work to prevent attacks on Z. Y is aware of X’s purposes and does not object to X using Y’s 
airspace. X attacks Z. 
c)   In order to carry out the attack, X must fly through the airspace of Y. Y is aware of X’s 
purposes but does not object to X using Y’s airspace. X attacks Z. 
These scenarios correspond to complicity by action, complicity by omission, and complicity 
by inaction, respectively. Drawing upon the prior discussion, this article will assess State Y’s 
responsibility for complicity under Article 16; providing a vivid demonstration of the distinctive, 
yet complementary natures of complicity by omission, complicity by inaction, and positive 
obligations in international law. Ultimately, this article submits that complicity should impose 
responsibility in all three scenarios.  
2   Complicity 
2.1   History of the Concept in International Law 
Complicity concerns the wrongfulness of contributing to the wrongful act of another; it is 
recognised in criminal law regimes, finding expression in the prohibition of aid and assistance.14 
                                                      
13 This scenario is employed solely to demonstrate the mechanics of the law of State responsibility, and thus it shall 
be assumed that this attack results in the commission of an internationally wrongful act in violation of Article 2(4) 
UN Charter. Related use of force issues and controversies in the Charter rules on the use of force will not be 
addressed in this paper. 
14 M. Jackson, Complicity in International Law, (Oxford, OUP, 2015) pp. 10 - 11. 
It is derivative in the sense that the wrongfulness of the actions of the assister is derived from the 
wrongfulness of the actions of the principal,15 though various legal systems offer distinctive 
conceptualisations of this relationship. Common law systems tend to view complicity as 
imputational, with the result that the assister is treated as having committed the act of the 
principal.16 Civil law systems, by contrast, view complicity as non-imputational – the acts of 
complicity are penalised as exactly that – acts of complicity in the wrongful act of another. This 
latter model reflects the approach of Article 16 ASR.17 Complicity notes the effect that States are 
able to have on the commission of internationally wrongful acts by others, and enforces the 
axiom that “I am responsible for my actions”, recognising that “my own actions inevitably 
include my actions of contributing to your actions”.18 Thus, the concept acknowledges assistance 
as indirect causal contributions to the harm caused by the principal. 
2.1.1   Article 16 ASR 
There was a certain unease surrounding complicity in the early drafts of the ASR; though 
contained in Article 25, it was seen to represent progressive development, rather than 
codification of the law.19 This is somewhat surprising given that the concept had, in essence, 
received judicial attention nearly 30 years previous in the Corfu Channel case.20 Though recently 
                                                      
15 Various terms are employed to refer to the roles, including secondary and primary, accessory and principal, 
accessory and perpetrator. This paper shall use ‘assister’ and ‘principal’. 
16 Thus, in England and Wales, an accomplice to murder is a murderer: Section 8, the Accessories and Abettors Act 
1861. See: Jackson, supra note 14, pp. 18–21. 
17 ASR Commentary, Article 16, at para 10.  
18 J. Gardner, ‘Complicity and Causality’ 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2007, p. 132. 
19 R. Ago, Seventh Report on State Responsibility, (A/CN.4/307 and Add.1–2), in Yearbook of the ILC 1978, vol. II 
(1), para. 74. 
20 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgment of April 9th, 
1949: I.C. J. Reports 1949, at p. 4, para. 22. Hereinafter ‘Corfu Channel’. Corten and Klein, supra note 11, p. 318. 
Aust, Complicity, supra note 1, p. 227. For a view that the ICJ was actually dealing with joint responsibility, not 
complicity see: Crawford, supra note 8, p. 405. 
accepted by the ICJ as having achieved customary status,21 there remain questions over the 
precise contours of complicity.22  
From its introduction in draft Article 25, to its contemporary conception in Article 16 ASR, 
there were few conceptual alterations to the provision. The terms ‘accessory’ and ‘third State’ 
were discarded, 23  the subjective link between the assistance and the primary wrong was 
strengthened,24 and the opposability requirement was added;25 but there was no change in the 
underlying rationale. Complicity functions to attach responsibility to acts which are prima facie 
permissible, but acquire a character of wrongfulness due to their contribution to the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act by another. Thus, Article 16 sits rather uncomfortably within 
ARISWA, being, in truth, not a secondary norm, owing to its ability to confer responsibility.26  
In international law, complicity is related to, but conceptually distinct from, other forms of 
liability such as shared and joint responsibility.27 Shared responsibility, as understood by the 
University of Amsterdam SHARES project, is defined by three key features: the responsibility of 
multiple actors, for their contribution to a single outcome, where responsibility is distributed 
between the actors separately.28 Complicity, being premised on an understanding of individual 
                                                      
21 Bosnia v. Serbia, supra note 8, at para. 420. 
22  Aust, supra note 1, at p. 100. Crawford, supra note 8, at p. 405. As a comprehensive examination of the 
customary status of the elements of complicity is beyond the scope of this paper, Article 16, though not a formal 
source of law, shall be taken as representative of law regarding complicity. 
23 Compare: Ago, Seventh Report, supra note 19, at para. 77, and Article 16 ASR. 
24 From “in order to help that State commit an internationally wrongful offence”, to “if it is established that it is 
rendered for the commission of an internationally wrongful act”.  Ago, Seventh Report, supra note 19, para. 60; and 
Yearbook of the ILC 1978, vol. I, (A/CN.4/SER.A/1978), p. 269, para. 2. 
25 Providing for complicity only in situations where “the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State”. Compare: Ago, Seventh Report, supra note 19, para. 60; Yearbook of the ILC 1978, vol. I, 
(A/CN.4/SER.A/1978), p. 269, para. 2; and Article 16(b) ASR. 
26  Secondary rules are considered to be “The general conditions under international law for the State to be 
considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom.” They 
are distinct from primary rules, which “define the content of the international obligations, the breach of which gives 
rise to responsibility.” ASR General Commentary, para 1. 
27 Crawford, supra note 8, p. 399. 
28 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework, 34 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 2013, pp. 366–368. 
(and possibly exclusive) 29  responsibility, constitutes a separate wrongful act and excludes 
genuine shared responsibility.30 A further distinction can be made between shared responsibility 
and joint responsibility; the latter being a narrower approach to contributions to a single 
wrongful act, as enshrined in Article 47 ASR. Though there are arguably instances in which 
complicity and joint responsibility overlap, “where a State’s role is ancillary, it should be 
deemed complicit only”. 31  By contrast, joint responsibility requires a higher degree of 
participation. As a form of secondary liability, complicity is distinct from forms of liability in 
which all participants are vicariously liable for the acts of the others,32 thus excluding cases of 
State ‘co-perpetration’.33  
The final provision on complicity, in Article 16 ASR, reads as follows: 
 
“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing 
so if:  
a)   That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances on the 
internationally wrongful act; and 
b)   The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.” 
 
2.1.2   Specific Complicity Rules and Article 16 ASR 
A distinction should be maintained between a general prohibition of complicity, such as is found 
in Article 16 ASR, and more targeted, specific prohibitions. Certain areas of international law 
contain such provisions, which have an analogous effect to that of Article 16. One such area is 
the use of force, where acts of assistance, which could otherwise be characterised as wrongful 
under Article 16, potentially incur responsibility under a variety of other rules pertaining to 
                                                      
29 Ibid., at p. 384. 
30 Lanovoy, supra note 1, at p. 150. 
31 J. Quigley, ‘Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law of State Responsibility’, 57 British 
Yearbook of International Law 1986, p. 106. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Yearbook of the ILC, 1978, Vol. II, Part II, at p. 99, para. 2. (A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.l (Part 2)); ASR 
Commentary, Article 16, at para 1. 
assistance in the use of force specifically. Article 3(f) of the Definition of Aggression,34 relevant 
UN Security Council decisions either in and of themselves or in conjunction with Article 2(5) 
UN Charter, Article 41(2) ASR, and positive obligations arising from the Corfu Channel case, 
may render the actions of assistance illegal, without the need for recourse to Article 16.35 
Similarly, in international humanitarian law, common Article 1 Geneva Conventions, and in 
human rights law, Article 2(1) ICCPR, like the Corfu Channel case, impose positive obligations 
on States.36  The interaction of positive obligations and Article 16 complicity will be analysed in 
detail in section two. This article will not deal with norm specific provisions such as Article 3(f) 
of the Definition of Aggression, and will limit itself to consideration of Article 16.  
In a sense, these specific complicity regimes partially detract from the utility of a secondary 
rule of general application, as the specific rules concern the same conduct and circumvent “the 
deficiencies which are attached to Article 16”.37 It is worth noting, however, that despite the 
existence of these specific provisions Article 16 remains a valuable rule, offering a ‘baseline’ 
prohibition of assistance that maintains significance due its universal norm coverage and the 
relative paucity of specific provisions in other areas.38 
2.2   Omissions in Article 16 
This section will examine whether Article 16 excludes the possibility of complicity by omission. 
In doing so it shall consider whether omissions are necessarily incapable of satisfying any of the 
constituent parts of Article 16, but first it is necessary to delineate the meaning of ‘omission’. 
2.2.1   Omissions Liability 
Liability for a failure to act can arise under the guise of different legal concepts, and certain types 
of liability often deceptively appear as omissions. In order to pinpoint the exact meanings of 
                                                      
34 United Nations General Assembly Resolution (XXIX), The Definition of Aggression, (A/RES/29/3314). 
35 Corten and Klein, The Limits of Complicity, supra note 11, at p. 380. For a definition and discussion of positive 
obligations arising out of the Corfu Channel case see section 2.3. 
36 Marco Sassoli, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, 84 International Review 
of the Red Cross 2002, p. 413. 
37 Aust, supra note 1, p. 416. 
38 Ibid. 
complicity by omission and complicity by inaction, a distinction between direct omission 
responsibility, commission by omission, complicity by action, complicity by omission, and 
complicity by inaction is necessary. Direct omission responsibility arises where passivity is 
prohibited by a specific rule. The Geneva Conventions, for example, impose positive obligations 
on States. Where a State fails to fulfil these positive obligations they are directly responsible for 
their omission. Responsibility for commission by omission can arise when the primary rule is 
negative, but there is a special relationship justifying the imposition of liability for omissions. A 
parent allowing a child to starve to death may be considered liable for murder. Complicity by 
action is the traditional conception of Article 16; it arises where a State provides positive acts of 
assistance to another in order for that State to commit an internationally wrongful act. This 
situation is illustrated by Scenario A. Complicity by omission is an altogether more difficult 
concept. As illustrated by Scenario B, it arises where there is a pre-existing positive obligation 
incumbent on the State, and that State, in failing to fulfil this duty, facilitates the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act. As will be shown, complicity by omission has received negative 
judicial treatment, and the existence and viability of the concept has not yet received categorical, 
unqualified academic endorsement. Complicity by inaction is merely a theoretical possibility 
raised by this article. It would arise where a State knowingly acquiesces, and without breaching a 
positive obligation, allows another State to breach an obligation owed to that State, in order to 
commit an internationally wrongful act against a third State. Complicity by inaction is illustrated 
by Scenario C. If the law of State responsibility accepts that omissions are able to satisfy the 
material element of complicity under Article 16, then there appears to be no reason why culpable 
complicity by inaction may not also engage responsibility. 
2.2.2   The Current Position of Omission Liability in the Law of State Responsibility 
Article 16 and its Commentary do not mention omissions. This is perhaps surprising given that 
previous ILC reports noted that cases of omission responsibility “are at least as numerous as 
those based on positive acts, and no difference in principle exists between the two”.39 Rather 
than interpreting the absence as indicative of an intention to exclude the possibility of complicity 
by omission, the better view is that “the ILC saw no reason to deviate from its general rule, 
                                                      
39 ASR Commentary, Article 2, at para. 4. 
namely that State conduct can consist of an action or an omission”.40 Indeed, the interplay 
between complicity and responsibility arising from omissions had been discussed by the ILC 
during the drafting process, so the issue could not have been beyond their contemplation.41 The 
ICJ has interpreted complicity as necessarily involving positive acts, holding that: “complicity 
always requires that some positive action is taken … while complicity results from commission, 
violation of the obligation to prevent results from omission”.42 Whilst the robustness of this 
determination is beyond dispute, its relevance to Article 16 is questionable. In Bosnia, the Court 
was primarily engaged in interpreting the Genocide Convention, and even if it was interpreting 
Article 16, it did so having transposed the exclusion of complicit omissions from the complicity 
provision in the Genocide Convention.43 Thus, this limitation may not apply at all to Article 16,44 
and without a definitive pronouncement on the potential for complicity by omission, 
consideration of an omission’s theoretical capacity to satisfy the requirements of Article 16 is 
necessary. 
 Article 16 is commonly seen as consisting of three parts: the material element, the 
subjective element, and the opposability requirement.45  The material element is concerned with 
the types of acts that may constitute complicity; the subjective element refers to the requisite 
mental state of the assister; and the opposability rule requires that the norm violated was also 
owed by the assister.  
2.3   The Material Element 
                                                      
40 Aust, supra note 1, p. 227. 
41 ASR Commentary, Article 16, at para. 2. See also: Ago, Seventh Report, supra note 19, at para. 57. 
42 Bosnia v Serbia, supra note 8, para. 432.  
43 Crawford, supra note 8, at pp. 403–405. 
44 V. Lanovoy, ‘Responsibility for Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act: Revisiting a Structural Norm’, 
paper presented at the SHARES Conference ‘Foundations of Shared Responsibility in International Law’, 18 
November 2011, p. 12.  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170406> last visited 17/03/16 
45 Crawford, supra note 8, pp. 401 – 410; Lanovoy, supra note 1, pp. 140 - 141; Aust, supra note 1, p.194.  Or, 
alternatively: the conduct element, the nexus between the assistance and the principal’s wrong, the fault of the 
assister, and the double obligation requirement.  Jackson, supra note 14, at p. 153.   
Throughout the drafting process of complicity, the aid or assistance was primarily defined by 
reference to its link to the wrongful act, rather than the inherent character of the assistance.46 It 
appears that “all kinds of aid and assistance fall within the rule”, and that the key question is 
“what is the required relationship between the aid and assistance, and the wrongful act of the 
assisted State?”47 Adopting what is essentially a causality-based test, the ILC provides only the 
briefest of guidance, stating that the assistance need not be “essential to the performance of the 
internationally wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act”.48 The 
absence of a quality-based limitation suggests that even the most minimal conduct would be 
sufficient so long as it contributed significantly to the wrongful act.49 Thus, the provision of food 
supplies for humanitarian purposes cannot amount to complicity in a use of force.50 Here then, 
one may note the introduction into international law of a problem with which domestic systems, 
as well as international criminal law, have grappled, namely, whether omissions count as 
causes.51 It is this causation issue that is decisive in assessing whether complicity by omission is 
possible.  
2.3.1   Passivity and Causation 
If omissions can count as causes, then they are capable of constituting the material element of 
complicity. In addition to the other legal regimes that have confronted this challenging issue, 
much has been written on this topic in theoretical and philosophical terms.52  
Causation, in a rudimentary sense, is determined by a ‘but for’ test which relies on the 
counter factual; 53 what is crucial is that “had you done something else, the wrongdoing would 
not have occurred”.54 In this sense, an omission can clearly contribute to a wrongful act. Taking 
                                                      
46 B. Graefrath, ‘Complicity in the Law of International Responsibility’, 2 Revue Belge de Droit International 1996, 
p. 374. 
47 Jackson, supra note 14, p. 154. 
48 ASR Commentary, Article 15, para. 5.  
49 Lanovoy, supra note 1, p. 144. Crawford, supra note 8, p. 402. 
50 Yearbook of the ILC 1978, vol. I, supra note 24, para. 239. 
51 Lepora and Goodin, On Complicity and Compromise, (Oxford, OUP, 2013), p. 46. 
52 E. Weinryb, ‘Omissions and Responsibility’, 30 The Philosophical Quarterly, 1980, p. 2. 
53 Gattini, supra note 9, p. 709. 
54 Lepora and Goodin, supra note 51, p. 45. 
Scenario B, we can see that had State Y objected to State’s X use of its airspace, there would 
have been no attack on State Z. Therefore State Y’s omission was a cause of the internationally 
wrongful act of State X, thus satisfying the material element of aid and assistance. To view 
omissions in this way is to treat omissions as no more than a certain type of action, and yields 
little difficulty in establishing that they have consequences.55 Alternatively, omissions have been 
distinguished from action, and as a result, been characterised as absent causal consequences; on 
this view, they are “merely the absence of a preventive anti-cause”.56 Other authors have focused 
on this issue in moral terms; opining that “the moment we realize that harm to human beings 
could be prevented, we are entitled to see the failure to prevent it as a cause”.57 In the context of 
Article 16, this approach would see a widening of the material element, and a utilisation of the 
subjective element as a limiting factor. But subjective elements have their own unique issues in 
international law, and this approach could therefore be said to be unworkable.58 In sum, the 
scholarship in this area does not provide a definitive answer. 
2.3.2   Legal Treatment of Passivity as Assistance 
This section will consider the treatment of passivity in law in order to discover whether other 
regimes accept passivity as a form of action.59 Domestic conceptions of the omissions liability 
differ greatly; the tort law of England and Wales does not recognise liability for passivity except 
in circumstances where there is some prior obligation to act,60 whereas the French criminal law 
penalises such failures to act with possible imprisonment.61 In international criminal law, liability 
for aiding and abetting can accrue by omission in limited circumstances. There is no liability for 
inaction however; the accused must have been obliged to prevent the crime from being brought 
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about.62 Thus, these regimes do not recognise liability for passivity in and of itself; such liability 
arises only where there is a special factor (usually a relationship) justifying the imposition of 
liability. Similarly, in international law, responsibility may be incurred by an omission in the 
breach of a positive obligation. Increasingly, scholars are departing from a conventional position 
which restricts complicit conduct to acts alone, and are recognising that omissions may also be 
relevant to complicity on the basis that “omissions do assist in the commission of wrongdoing”.63 
This seems in keeping with the State practice on the issue. The UK Parliament’s Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, regarding allegations of UK complicity in torture, for example, held that 
complicity in torture entails provision of “assistance to another State in the commission of 
torture, or acquiescing in such torture”.64  In discussing the material element of Article 16, 
authors have drawn on a wide range of State practice, much of which demonstrates objections, 
on legal grounds, to omissions which aid and assist a separate wrongful act.65 
Whilst it appears that it will be difficult for an omission to meet the causation requirement, it 
is increasingly recognised that omissions are not excluded from satisfying the material element 
of Article 16.  
2.4   The Subjective Element 
Though the text of Article 16 only requires that the assisting State assists with “knowledge of the 
circumstances”, the Commentary seems to impose an intent requirement, stating that the 
assistance “must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of that act, and must 
actually do so”.66 This appears to be in conflict with a later comment that, unless the primary 
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obligation requires intent “it is only the act of the State that matters, independently of any 
intention”. 67  This perceived ‘culpa requirement’ has attracted academic criticism for being 
unworkable, and depriving the concept of complicity of much of its usefulness. 68  These 
criticisms, in additional to lamenting a lack of clarity, generally relate to the difficultly of 
ascribing intention to States;69 a problem which is heightened when applied to omissions, as it is 
even more difficult to show that a State’s passivity was intended to facilitate the actions of 
another.  
In addressing the internally inconsistent approach to the subjective element in ASR, authors 
have offered a variety of interpretations. Relying on another ILC comment, which notes that the 
subjective element limits Article 16 to “cases where the aid or assistance given is clearly linked 
to the subsequent wrongful conduct”, 70  the provision has been interpreted as ensuring a 
contribution to the wrongful act.71 But given the content of the material element of Article 16, 
this understanding appears to cause a superfluous duplication, rendering the subjective element 
redundant. Alternative interpretations attempt to reconcile the ILC’s comments by ignoring any 
distinction between purpose and knowledge, with the result that “a State providing aid with 
knowledge of intended wrongful use” would satisfy the subjective element. 72 This latter view 
finds support in the earlier comments of Robert Ago, that complicity “necessarily presupposes 
intent to collaborate … (and hence) knowledge of the specific purpose (of the receiving State)”.73 
A third view is that the level of knowledge or intent could be dictated by reference to the primary 
norm violated. In the extreme, this view would see complicity “limited to violations of 
international law which adversely affect the international community as a whole”.74 Aust offers a 
more conservative suggestion which would entail “a less rigorous requirement of knowledge and 
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intent [to] be found in the regime of serious breaching of peremptory rules”.75 Therefore, Aust 
suggests, a due diligence standard for complicity would be appropriate where a foreign State 
uses a host’s territory to violate human rights obligations.76 As it may be more difficult to show 
that a State intended to facilitate by passivity, a strict intent requirement may weaken the position 
of complicity by omission. But as no such interpretation has received wide endorsement, there is 
nothing in the subjective element which excludes the possibility of complicity by omission. 
2.5   The Opposability Requirement 
This element has attracted academic attention, being perceived as an unfortunate concession to 
bilateral sympathies.77 Whilst certainly a restrictive, limiting requirement, it does not have any 
special relevance to complicity by omission. 
3   Positive Obligations and Complicity by Omission 
Having established that nothing in Article 16 excludes omissions from constituting complicity, it 
is clear that complicity by omission is, at least, theoretically possible. This article will now 
examine the concept’s relationship with positive obligations. It shall approach this issue by 
addressing two primary questions: does complicity by omission rely on the violation of positive 
obligations? And if so, is the notion useful, given the duality of responsibility that necessarily 
results? 
3.1   Positive Obligations in International Law 
In order to discharge negative obligations, States are only required to forbear from certain 
actions. Positive obligations, by contrast, require State action. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
obliges States to refrain from the use of force, and thus is negative; Article 2(1) ICCPR 
necessitates action in order to ‘ensure’ civil and political rights, and thus is positive. Whilst 
positive obligations encompass all norms which require actions for discharge of liability, this 
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article deals only with obligations of prevention. Other positive obligations do not concern the 
actions of third parties and have no direct relevance to complicity. These include obligations to 
fulfil, emanating from human rights treaties.78  
Obligations of prevention, or due diligence obligations,79 can manifest themselves in two 
ways; the regulation of internal conduct, and the regulation of external actors. Internally, these 
norms operate in a matter that mimics or replicates negative rules. Thus, in Armed Activities, 
Uganda was found responsible for failing to exercise vigilance and prevent looting in territory it 
occupied when its own forces carried out the acts of looting.80 Whilst these acts could have been 
committed by Uganda directly, an inability to attribute the conduct would not have prevented 
responsibility arising, due to the clear violation of the positive obligation to prevent.81 Externally, 
these obligations oblige States to take action to regulate third party conduct. This third party may 
be an individual (as in the Tehran Hostages case),82 a State (as was argued in Corfu Channel), or 
a natural event.83 These external types of positive obligations, where the third party is a State, in 
essence, function as a form of primary derivative responsibility and have a similar role to 
complicity – in both cases the conduct (including passivity) is wrongful due to another State’s 
action.  
3.2   Positive Obligations and Facilitation of Complicity by Omission 
This section challenges the view, noted above, that complicity by passivity is only possible 
where a positive obligation has been breached.84 In the scenario provided, responsibility for 
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complicity by omission can occur in Scenario B but not in Scenario C. Though the (in-)action is 
the same, the presence of a positive obligation to prevent, incumbent on State Y, means that 
responsibility for complicity by omission will arise in addition to responsibility flowing from the 
breach of the positive obligation.  
3.2.1   Can Positive Obligations Facilitate Complicity by Omission? 
The view that positive obligations are necessary to facilitate complicity by omission may appear 
justified where the two responsibilities are engaged by the same act. However, a slight nuance 
illustrates the merely technical importance of the co-incidence. The positive obligation need not 
concern the same content as the primary norm violated; the omission simply needs to be causally 
connected to the violation. In situations where the primary norm and the positive obligation 
relate to different content, it is unclear why there is a requirement of a breach of an obligation. 
Aust provides an illustrative example of this type of scenario: Israel requested permission from 
the US for a flight over US-controlled Iraqi territory in order to carry out an attack on Iran. The 
US, by virtue of the Status of Forces Agreement 2008, was under an obligation to consult the 
Iraqi government in the event of any external or internal threat which would violate Iraq’s 
sovereignty. This obligation did not amount to a duty to take unilateral measures against Israel. If 
the US granted permission it would violate the positive obligations owed to Iraq under the Status 
of Forces Agreement, and because of this, US responsibility for complicity in the Israeli attack 
may be engaged.85 If there was no such obligation, the US could not be held responsible for 
complicity in the Israeli attack on Iran. In a sense, this treaty has the effect of widening the scope 
of complicity, and facilitating responsibility under Article 16 where there would otherwise have 
been none. This is so even though the positive obligation does not relate to the use of force 
against Iran, but to a duty to inform Iraq before granting overflight rights. This example similarly 
demonstrates the merely technical function of this positive obligation prerequisite in another 
sense: not only did the positive obligation not refer to the same violation in which the US may 
have been complicit, but the positive obligation was also not owed to the victim State. The 
imposition of responsibility for complicity in this situation could be more easily justified if the 
US owed the positive obligation to Iran, or the Israeli attack was aimed at Iraq. But the lack of 
co-incidence exposes this rule as a merely formal requirement without doctrinal value; it is 
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difficult to see why a norm of a different content, owed to a different State, can create complicity 
where there otherwise would be none. 
If the violation of positive obligations is a necessary precondition to complicity in such 
situations, then the law provides either an absence or a duality of responsibility. Either no 
primary violation occurred, in which case there can also be no complicity; or there was a primary 
violation, in which case there may also be complicity by omission. When a positive obligation is 
violated, responsibility for complicity by omission will accompany the responsibility flowing 
from the primary violation where the subjective and opposability requirements are met. This 
seems to reduce the role of complicity somewhat; it is still ancillary, but is more closely linked to 
the assister’s wrongful omission than the principal’s wrongful act.  
3.2.2   Can Positive Obligations Address the Causation Issue? 
As noted above, the objective element of Article 16 is causation-based.86  In the context of 
ongoing uncertainty as to whether omissions can truly have causes, it appears that there will be 
significant difficulty in showing that omissions can constitute complicity. Some authors and 
legal regimes seem to suggest that the causative issue concerning omissions is circumvented 
when a positive obligation is breached. On this view, omissions have consequences where there 
was a prior obligation to act; where “there is a duty to do something and you do nothing, your 
‘doing nothing’ counts as a cause”.87 If this is so, it provides strong support for the concept of 
complicity by omission; the view that positive obligations facilitate complicity by omission 
would aid the leaping of the causative hurdle that the objective element presents. But, it is 
submitted, this assessment misunderstands or ignores the distinct nature of these two 
responsibilities, and is based on a “confusion between issues of ‘causation’ on the one hand and 
issues of ‘duty’ on the other”.88 There is, in fact, no material difference in the causative value of 
the omission in Scenario B and the inaction in Scenario C. Accordingly, the better view is that a 
“legal duty cannot transform an omission from a nothing that can cause nothing, to a nothing that 
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can have ‘consequences’, i.e. can cause something”.89 Thus, the ability to satisfy the objective 
element, which turns upon causation, is the same for both omissions and inactions; either both 
omissions and inactions are capable, or both are incapable, of constituting complicity. 
3.2.3   Do Positive Obligations Indicate a Capacity to Influence? 
If positive obligations do in some way address the causation-omissions issue, then perhaps this is 
because their presence is indicative of the capacity to influence a situation, and allows a failure 
to act to be seen as the factual cause of a harm.90  Depending on the interpretation of the 
subjective element of Article 16, capacity to influence may be an important determination in 
whether an omission or inaction is sufficient to invoke complicity.91 If the subjective requirement 
is modified by the primary norm violated, then this will be the case.92 Ordinarily, however, the 
standard for violation of positive obligations, not complicity, will be capacity to influence.93 In 
any event, there is no reason why that issue cannot be addressed directly, thus eschewing the 
unnecessary evidential detour through positive obligations. 
3.2.4   Does a Breach of Positive Obligations Increase Culpability? 
Another way in which it has been suggested that positive obligations justify the imposition of 
responsibility for complicity is that a failure to act, which breaches an obligation, is highly 
culpable. In this vein, Jackson opines that complicity should include “particularly culpable 
omissions, specifically those where the accomplice state had knowledge of the wrongful act and 
failed to act in breach of such a specific obligation”.94 This may be an important consideration in 
international criminal law or domestic criminal law systems, but without a clear cut, general rule, 
the role of fault in State responsibility is less clear.95 Reference instead is variously made to the 
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primary norm which the complicit acts aid (which of course will differ from case to case) or a 
knowledge requirement which does not assess fault.96 Thus, fault or culpability in its current 
manifestation in Article 16 is not a sufficiently sound basis for the justification of complicity by 
omission.  
In short, the relationship between positive obligations and complicity is not one of 
facilitation. Given that omissions do not offend the constitutive elements of Article 16 and do not 
require positive obligations to facilitate their being complicit conduct, does international law 
recognise complicity by inaction? This question will be addressed in section four. But first, in the 
context of questions over the utility of complicity, the interrelation of positive obligations and 
complicity requires examination. 
3.3   The Distinct Nature of Complicity by Omission 
In the Corfu Channel case the ICJ addressed Albania’s responsibility for the damage caused to 
two UK vessels by mines laid in an international waterway in the Corfu strait. The UK submitted 
that the mines were either laid with the knowledge or connivance of Albania, or alternatively, 
that Albania came to know of their having been laid. Either way, Albania, according to the UK, 
failed to warn other States of their existence. 
In holding Albania responsible, the ICJ articulated a general due diligence obligation 
consisting of “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States”.97 A general principle of due diligence, or a general 
positive obligation, had already been affirmed as early as 1925 in the Spanish Zones case, which 
established “the responsibility for events which may affect international law and which occur in 
a given territory”98 as a corollary of sovereignty. Again, three years later in the Islands of Palmas 
award, it was held that States have the obligation “to protect within the territory the rights of 
other States”. 99 Additionally, the Trail Smelter award in 1938 elucidated what is now a 
cornerstone of international environmental law; namely, that “no State has the right to use or 
permit use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of 
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another”.100 This general positive obligation has been supplemented over time by an increasingly 
comprehensive positive obligations regime. 101 Specific obligations can be found in human rights 
law, as embodied in obligations to protect and fulfil, in the Geneva Conventions, and in 
environmental law. 
In addition to a growing prevalence and coverage, some authors argue that there is a judicial 
preference for positive obligations over complicity. This was the case in Corfu Channel, where 
the ICJ favoured drawing upon a concept of positive obligations to finding Albania complicit in 
the wrongful act of another.102 The overlap is further evidenced by the fact that the State practice 
referred to in the Commentary to Article 16 appears to exemplify violations of positive 
obligations as well. In this vein, Corten and Klein commented: “Whenever complicity can be 
established, the principle of due diligence has been breached; the principle of due diligence can 
be breached in numerous situations where complicity… cannot be established”.103 In addressing 
this view, the following section will answer two questions: has the normative reach of positive 
obligations grown so extensive as to fully encompass complicity, or does complicity possess a 
distinct character?104 And, given that positive obligations seem to offer a less challenging route 
to responsibility and appear more manageable, where the concepts overlap, does the concept of 
complicity retain any utility?105  
3.3.1   Differentiating Between Positive Obligations and Complicity 
In Bosnia the ICJ outlined two perceived differences between complicity and positive 
obligations. First, that complicity is engaged by positive act whereas responsibility for breach of 
positive obligations accrues by omission; and second, that the two have disparate subjective 
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thresholds.106 This article challenges the first proposition generally. The second, in addition to 
several other conceptual differences, shall be dealt with below.107 
3.3.1.1   Normative and Geographical Coverage 
The general due diligence obligation upon which the argument is premised is not, in truth, all 
that general. Firstly, the normative coverage is limited; “it is only in relation to established rights 
that an obligation of due diligence is owed by one State to another”.108 Any general due diligence 
obligation incumbent upon States to ensure that their territory is not used to the detriment of 
others is confined to environmental law, as per the Trail Smelter case; 109 and aggression, under 
Article 3(f) of the Definition of Aggression. Secondly, it is geographically limited; in Corfu 
Albania’s responsibility was engaged upon the basis of “every State's obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”.110 However, 
Albania would not have been under an obligation to inform the British vessels if aware of mines 
in the Indian Ocean, for example, as “the Corfu Channel holdings concentrated on duties owed 
for harm realized in a state's own territory”.111 The archetypal situation of complicity, where “a 
State allows its territory to be used by another State for perpetrating an act of aggression against 
a third State”,112 would therefore not engage responsibility under the due diligence principle. 
Rather, the territorial State would be responsible upon the basis of the norm specific complicity 
rule in the Definition of Aggression. Complicity then, may be thought of as a type of ‘primary 
meta-rule’,113 as responsibility for complicity knows no geographical limitation, and need not 
attach to certain norms. There is clearly a disparity in the coverage of the concepts. 
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3.3.1.2   The Existence of a ‘Primary Wrong’ 
In order to invoke complicity under Article 16, the primary wrong needs to actually occur. With 
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter, it is not clear that this is the case for positive obligations. 
In Tehran, it was held that the “inaction of the Iranian Government by itself constituted clear and 
serious violation of Iran’s obligations”.114  But, later, in interpreting the positive obligations 
emanating from the Genocide Convention, the ICJ held that “a State can be held responsibility 
for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide was actually committed”.115 
Again, as was previously suggested, it is not clear whether this determination is confined to those 
positive obligations arising out of the Genocide Convention. For complicity, conversely, the 
position is clear: the wrongful act of the principal must actually occur.116 
3.3.1.3   Due Diligence Requires the Exercise of Control 
Due diligence obligations appear to require a level of control that is not required for 
complicity.117 This has frequently found manifestation in the territorial limitation of positive 
obligations of prevention. Accordingly, in Corfu Channel Albania violated its positive 
obligations because the act occurred on its territory, and was therefore treated as an act over 
which Albania exercised effective control. This requirement is not always strictly tethered to 
territory, however. In Cyprus v. Turkey, the ECtHR found that Turkey controlled and supported 
the Turkish Cypriot administration in Northern Cyprus without that administration being on 
Turkish territory.118 There is no requirement that there was effective control over another State 
for the imposition of responsibility for complicity. Such control is more akin to the test for direct 
attribution under Article 8 ASR, as per the ICJ decision in Nicaragua.119  
3.3.1.4   Level of Culpa 
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Despite the difficulty of discerning the contours of the subjective element of Article 16, it is clear 
that generally, the two concepts will impose different standards of behaviour; “’capacity to 
influence effectively’ now emerges as an applicable standard for the obligation to prevent, 
whereas complicity requires ‘full knowledge of facts’”.120 The result is a much lower threshold 
for due diligence obligations, which imposes responsibility “upon constructive knowledge or risk 
that the breach will occur”.121 One of the primary targets for the academic criticism of Article 16 
has been the subjective element.122 Much of this criticism has centred on the difficulty of proving 
that a State possessed a certain state of mind; it will be challenging to determine whether a State 
really intended to facilitate an internationally wrongful act. In this sense, the constructive 
knowledge aspect of positive obligations provides a significant advantage; it will be much easier 
to show that there has been a violation of a positive obligation. 
3.3.1.5   Positive Obligations are Vague Concepts 
Complicity is a more rigid notion, which in some instances can be difficult to prove. Positive 
obligations, on the other hand, allow for consideration of policy questions that would not be 
relevant in assessing whether there is responsibility under Article 16.123 In this sense, positive 
obligations can be seen as a useful residual method, allowing courts the latitude to establish 
responsibility “if they consider the result of a negative finding on responsibility to be unjust in 
other regards”.124 This view confirms that, whilst positive obligations may refer to the same 
conduct, they can facilitate a much more fluid assessment.  
3.3.2   The Usefulness of Complicity 
Some of the differences between complicity and positive obligations outlined above demonstrate 
the continued usefulness of complicity. The greater normative coverage and lack of effective 
control requirement, for example, show that complicity can be established in instances where a 
breach of positive obligations of prevention could not. But the criticisms levelled at complicity, 
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noted above, do carry some weight. It seems that given the increasing normative coverage of 
positive obligations, the instances in which only complicity responsibility is available will be 
somewhat reduced. But even where the two overlap, it is submitted that there is value in 
maintaining a separate concept of complicity.  
Most notably, the two modes of liability have a different moral worth. Cassese, when 
referring to the finding that Serbia was not complicit in Genocide but had breached its positive 
obligation to prevent Genocide, called the ICJ’s finding a mere ‘consolation prize’.125 Similarly, 
it has been recognised that complicity in the internationally wrongful act of another may “weigh 
more heavily” than a breach of a positive obligation.126 This is particularly so in the example 
given above concerning US obligations owed to Iraq, and possible complicity in a use of force 
by Israel against Iran.127 US complicity in an illegal use of force against Iran is a far more serious 
breach of international law than the violation of a technical rule in a bilateral treaty. Furthermore, 
complicity must be given a place in the law of State responsibility as States tend to articulate 
responsibility in terms of complicity, rather than by breach of a positive obligation; implicitly 
this feels like a neater and more accurate fit. 128  Importantly, complicity links certain acts 
together, noting that they form part of a larger whole. Showing that States played a role in US 
rendition and torture of suspected terrorists recognises the true nature of the large scale and 
systematic human rights violation. To view the assistance furnished by each individual State as a 
minor, separate wrong would be divorced from reality, and would constitute a gross 
misrepresentation of the situation. 
These two modes of liability should not be seen as competitors, vying for recognition as the 
dominant imposer of liability, but rather as complements, each with “structural advantages (that) 
will play out in some circumstances and will have no relevance in others”.129 Thus the approach 
of the ICJ in Corfu Channel was not only justifiable, but was also sensible; complicity is 
perceived as a more serious form of violation, and recourse will be had to the functional 
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alternative of positive obligations where complicity is not established on the facts.130 But this 
does not mean that complicity is redundant, even in cases of overlap; the best should not be the 
enemy of the good.  
4   Complicity by Inaction 
Thus far it has been shown that Article 16 does not exclude the possibility of complicity by 
omission, though it may be difficult to prove the causative link required for satisfaction of the 
material element. It has also been shown that complicity by omission is a concept distinct from 
positive obligations of prevention; the two are overlapping and reinforcing in some cases, but 
complicity, as a rule of general application, is wider and imposes responsibility separately. Given 
that positive obligations – the sole difference between omission and inaction – do not facilitate 
complicity by omission, this article will seek to examine the possibility of complicity by 
inaction. That is, the responsibility of a State for assistance in the internationally wrongful act of 
another, resulting from inaction, where the assister was not under a positive obligation to act. 
Returning to the scenario provided in the introduction, this concerns Scenario C, where State Y 
breaches no positive obligations to State Z.  
It is clear that in Scenario A, State Y is responsible under Article 16. The positive granting of 
permission to refuel constitutes aid and assistance as it has a causative link to the internationally 
wrongful act of State X. In Scenario B, State Y will be responsible for the breach of a positive 
obligation under the common security and defence policy, in addition to incurring responsibility 
for complicity in the internationally wrongful act of X. This passivity is an omission – it is a non-
doing contrary to the law – and thus it is capable of constituting aid and assistance under Article 
16.131 In Scenario C, there is no positive act which could fall within a traditional understanding 
of complicity, and no positive obligation was breached. However, it is submitted that there is no 
causative difference between the inaction in Scenario C and the omission in Scenario B; upon the 
application of a ‘but for’ causality test, the passivity in both situations has the same causative 
effect. Thus, if omissions are accepted as being capable of satisfying the requirements of Article 
16, the same must be said of inactions. 
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The distinction between the three situations is not as large as it first appears. An acceptance 
of responsibility in Scenario A but not Scenario C would allow a recasting of the facts for the 
avoidance of responsibility. Rather than positively grant the use of territory (action), States can 
justify that which would otherwise be aid and assistance by knowingly failing to object to the use 
of their territory (inaction).132 But, why should responsibility turn upon a deft manipulation of 
the facts? Is it acceptable that the authorisation of flyover rights would engage complicity, but 
acquiescence would not? Can the substitution of an active verb for a passive one be sufficient to 
avoid responsibility? Additionally, the distinction between Scenario B and Scenario C is 
somewhat illusory. It is not clear why the presence of a positive obligation of a different content 
and owed to a different State, is necessary to facilitate complicity.133 Should responsibility rely 
upon the existence of what may only be a trivial and indirectly related positive obligation? This 
article submits that permitting these distinctions is logically absurd and conceptually ill-founded, 
and that consequently international law should impose responsibility for complicit inactions. 
This claim finds support in the fact that inaction is able to meet the criteria set out in Article 16, 
it may be culpable, it is similar to pre-existing concepts, and features in State practice on aid and 
assistance. 
4.1   The Wrongfulness of Inaction 
To claim that inaction, as opposed to action or omission, is never wrongful, is akin to claiming 
that actions which themselves are not internationally wrongful acts are never wrongful. But this 
is precisely the function of derivative responsibility. The sale of weapons is not in and of itself an 
internationally wrongful act, but the consequences of this act (the contribution to an 
internationally wrongful act), combined with the subjective and opposability requirements, 
furnish the act with a character of wrongfulness. Therefore, on this basis, there cannot be a 
rejection of culpable inactions in the law of international responsibility, a priori. In this regard it 
is important to again note the central assumption and ethos of derivative responsibility under 
Article 16; namely, that “responsibility is ascribed for behaviour which is not per se 
unlawful”. 134  Indeed, draft Article 25 stated explicitly that: “the conduct in question (the 
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assistance) would not otherwise be internationally wrongful”.135 The assistance is wrongful, not 
because it breaches a primary norm, but because of the contribution it makes to the breach of a 
primary norm by the State receiving the assistance.  
As established above, the role of fault in the law of State responsibility is, notwithstanding, a 
rather uncertain ground upon which to found or dismiss the possibility of responsibility.136 In any 
event, it is not immediately clear that inaction is never culpable. Culpability, it seems to the 
present author, must be assessed with reference to the subjective element. In Scenario C State Y 
is geographically located between State X and State Z. With modern military technology, and the 
huge figures spent on defence systems, State Z could not possibly be attacked without State Y 
knowing of the attack and permitting the use of its territory or airspace for this purpose. Thus, 
unless State Y was labouring under some misunderstanding of State X’s intentions, or was 
unable to object to the use of their territory, State Y must be morally responsible for aiding and 
assisting an internationally wrongful attack on State Z. With full knowledge of the facts and an 
ability to act, this inaction must be considered culpable. This is arguably even more so if the only 
way that State Z could be attacked was through State Y. It is difficult to see how Lesotho could 
be attacked without the culpable involvement of South Africa, for example.  
4.2   Legal Recognition of Responsibility for Inaction 
Responsibility for ‘pure omissions’ is not an entirely new concept. Whilst complicity “imposes 
negative obligation(s) beyond simply prescribing the consequences of the breach of any given 
primary norm”, complicity by inaction would mimic the effect of imposing positive obligations; 
requiring States to act in a certain way. 137  Such responsibility would be equivalent to 
responsibility for a failure to enforce legal rights; State Y is responsible as, knowing of State X’s 
wrongful intention, State Y failed to enforce its legal right (territorial sovereignty), to the 
detriment of State Z. Similarly, couched in the language of positive obligations, a limited 
recognition of State bystander responsibility, which bears some resemblance to complicity by 
inaction, has been placed in a framework by Hakimi.138 Founded in human rights obligations of 
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protection, Hakimi argues that State bystander responsibility, which would engage on the basis 
of inaction, arises due to a State’s relationship with the abuser and the kind of harm caused.139 
Whilst both State bystander responsibility and complicity by inaction are concerned with the 
responsibility for passivity, bystander responsibility has limited application to inter-State 
relationships, and is based on positive obligations, not the ‘secondary rules’ of State 
responsibility.140 Limited forms of bystander liability also exist in domestic tort systems. In 
England and Wales, a defendant that had a special relationship to the plaintiff,141 created the 
source of the danger,142 induced the plaintiff’s reliance,143 or exercised control over the danger or 
source of the danger,144 may be exposed to bystander liability.145 This final ground is not based 
on a special relationship, a prior wrongful act by that defendant, or positive obligations, but is 
imposed due to the fact that the defendant could have prevented the harm, and chose not to. 
Thus, though complicity by inaction, as a derivative form of responsibility, is conceptually 
distinct from these primary rules, there is limited common ground between the two in the 
rationale employed, and conduit through which responsibility is imposed.  
4.3   State Practice 
Perhaps the most compelling argument for the recognition of complicity by inaction lies in the 
claims of States themselves. On numerous occasions States have noted the damage that can be 
caused by inaction, as opposed to omission (which in itself is wrongful). Returning to the 
opening example, State reactions to the treatment of terrorist suspects in the aftermath of the 11 
September 2001 attacks are again instructive. In 2001 the UN Security Council passed resolution 
1373, which prohibited State support of entities or persons engaged in terrorist acts, noting 
explicitly both active and passive support.146 In published internal governmental investigations 
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into allegations of complicity in torture and renditions, several States demonstrated an increasing 
acceptance that inaction, or passivity, can invoke international responsibility. The Dutch 
government, for example, in denying having played a role in abductions, stated that it had “no 
knowledge of such abductions and ha[d] not been involved in such abductions either actively or 
passively”.147 The UK parliamentary commission considered that responsibility for complicity 
would be engaged “if the UK is demonstrated to have a general practice of passively receiving 
intelligence information which has or may have been obtained under torture”.148 Likewise, a 
Council of Europe report found that “even acquiescence and connivance of the authorities in the 
acts of foreign agents affecting convention rights might engage the State party’s 
responsibility”.149 
Based on the foregoing, there are good reasons to recognise complicity by inaction. The material 
element presents a substantial challenge to the concept as it will be difficult to show that 
passivity had a causal effect. But this limitation applies equally to omissions, which have 
received partial, if not wholesale, recognition in international law, and are accepted as having 
causes in various other legal systems.150 Complicity by inaction would impose responsibility 
founded on an ability to avert harm, where the failure contributes to an internationally wrongful 
act, and the ‘assister’ in-acted with a view to facilitating this wrongful act. At its most narrow, 
complicity by inaction would resemblance an ex ante form of the obligations of non-assistance 
under Article 41(2) ASR regarding peremptory norms.151 
5   Conclusion 
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By establishing that the concept does not offend the constitutive elements of complicity in the 
ASR, this article has demonstrated the potential for responsibility for complicity by omission. It 
has shown how complicity by omission can and should be seen a concept distinct from breach of 
positive obligations of prevention, and taking this reasoning one step further has speculated on 
the possibility of complicity by inaction. 
Culpable passivity, as well as activity, should be fully included within the law of State 
responsibility. Such inclusion would enhance the doctrinal coherence, and ensure that conduct 
that facilitates a wrongful act is treated as such, without the need for recourse to the ‘consolation 
prize’ of positive obligations. The limited recognition of contributions to the maltreatment of 
terrorist suspects post 11 September 2001 is but a start to the creation of a cohesive derivative 
responsibility regime that can fully reconcile the disparities in moral and legal culpability. 
Though international law prohibits complicity by commission and by omission, it fails to 
acknowledge those situations where “through one's inaction one decisively contributes to the 
creation of conditions that enable (a wrongful act)”.152 To reduce and nullify the reprehensible 
effects of unchecked State coordination, and to encourage respect for the international rule of 
law, complicity must evolve further. In doing so it must recognise the manner in which States 
function in varying degrees of cohesion, moving beyond a mere recognition of active complicity. 
As Article 16 in its current interpretation is unfit for this purpose, the resort to vague and ill-
suited positive obligations is unsurprising. This is lamentable, as such a function should not be, 
and need not be, beyond the purview of the law of State responsibility. 
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